Firebase-Airborne- Alpha Company names of KIA's on FSB Airborne- A list of Firebases in Alpha Company, 2/501'sAO.FIREBASE AIRBORNEFirebase Airborne was located 42 km WSW Hue, 5 km SE FSB Goodman, 3km NW FSB Pepper.If you are a survivor for the battle of FSB Airborne and would liketo be interviewed for an upcoming magazine article and possible bookabout the attack, please contact me (SSgtBarski) at the following emailaddress for further details.The 101st Abn Div is putting together a written history of awardsfrom WWII, Vietnam, etc., for the BSM and higher. They are looking forall personal award citations that veterans and/or families have tosubmit. I will send you a copy of the information request and who tocontact. The trooper in-charge is stationed at Ft. Campbell and isfeverously working on getting as many of the names and citations aspossible so it can be published for the official 101st historicalrecord. He's for real and I've dealt with him for the last year.Thanks,Roger J.

Barskimore photos of GregBucknor FSB Airborne model - taken at the Springfield, ILArtillery reunion. AFTER ACTION REPORTSAPPER ATTACK ON FSB AIRBORNE - 13 MAY 1969After 2-17 Air Cavalry, working in theA Shau Valley, met stiff resistance and uncovered numerous largecaches in bunkers, the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div committed A/3-187 tosearch the area and to begin construction of Fire Support BaseAirborne. A/2-501st Infantry was brought into the area on 8 May andassumed responsibility for security.FSB Airborne is located on theeastern lip of the A Shau Valley on the north end of a long ridgerunning parallel to the valley. A small knoll about 50 to 75 feethigher than the fire base is located to the east and is incorporatedinto the defense plan. The west and northwest sides of the fire basefall away at a very steep rate making an approach from this directionextremely difficult. The northeast, east and south approaches aregradual slopes and offer the best avenues of approach into the firebase.

The fire base itself is very small. The approximate dimensionare 25 meters wide and 200 meters long; the mortar position on top ofthe knoll is circular with a 50 meter diameter. The vegetation in theimmediate vicinity of the fire base was destroyed, but the rain forestis only two to three meters from the wire, partially thinned due toair strikes and artillery, but still very thick. The fire base islayed out in the shape of a shoe sole with a detached mortar positionon the small knoll to the east. Three strands of concertina wireencircle the fire base with trip flares interspersed irregularly inthe wire.Located on Airborne on the night of 12May 1969 were Company A, 2-501 commanded by CPT Gordon C.

21 rows  This is the estimated pricing for common usage. Firebase Storage free limits are enforced.

Johnson,Company E (-), 2-501 commanded by CPT Alan J. Spoors, Battery C, 2-319Artillery (four tubes of 105mm) commanded by CPT William W.

Beverly,and C/319 FDC. Each of these forces had areas of responsibilityin the overall defensive plan. Routine harassing and interdictingfires and an occasional illumination round were fired by the artilleryunits until about 0300 hours.On 13 May 1969 at 0330, VC/NVA forcescommenced an all out attack on Fire Support Base Airborne. The attackwas conducted with stealth until the attacking force on the north hadcut through the three strands of concertina on the perimeter. Then aburst of AK-47 fire signaled the attack. The perimeter on the NW, NEand east side of the Fire Support Base erupted with heavilyconcentrated RPG and mortar fire. The mortar rounds were walked acrossthe perimeter and then back and forth across the FSB.

The sapper forcewas already inside the 1st Platoon of A Company and the artillerybattery on the northern portion of the fire base. The platoon CP andthe bunkers on either side of the CP were immediately destroyed bysatchel charges. Communication with the Company CP were destroyed.Charlie Battery (4 tubes, 105mm howitzers) received the brunt of theattack; the CP and the FDC was destroyed and all four tubes were putout of action. The battery was hit so rapidly that there was no timeto react.

Satchel charges demoralized, disrupted and destroyedthe command and control elements. The battery was unable to get off asingle round in its defense.Sergeants Barski and Counts, the 2ndand 1st squad leaders of the 1st Platoon, had pulled back, reorganizedand reestablished a defensive line. The platoon leader, Cushing, whohad been wounded in the initial wave of satchel charges, and recoveredenough to realize that his communications with the Company CP had beendestroyed, moved to the company CP to report his situation.

He arrivedback at CP at 0345 and was placed under a medic's care. CaptainJohnson then contacted SGT Barski, whose squad was still under RPG,mortar and AK-47 fire, but was holding its ground and reestablishedcontrol.The 2nd Platoon, under LT Pitts andlocated on the eastern edge of the fire base, had been alerted by theexploding satchel charges in the 1st Platoon area, also had a tripflare ignited in front of their position. Immediately, RPG rounds from20 to 30 meters away made direct hits on the three of the bunkers.However, this attacking force of NVA had been delayed in coming up thehill probably by the thick underbrush or trees blown down, and wereexposed cutting through the last strand of concertina. The 1st Platoonimmediately engaged the enemy with small arms fire and by rollinggrenades down the slope. Twelve NVA were left hanging on the wire, onewith wire cutters still grasped in his hand, and another with a 9mmpistol and flare gun.

This ended the attack on the 2nd Platoon exceptfor the continuous mortar and RPG fire.E Company (-), a mortar platoon, andthe 2nd and 3d Squads from he 3d Platoon, A/2-501, all which held thesmall knoll on the east side of the fire base, received a two prongattack from the NE and NW. The 81mm mortar platoon continued to fireillumination and HE fires throughout the conflict. The VC/NVA forcepenetrated into the perimeter far enough to capture an M60 machine gunand then were repulsed.

It was the actions of individuals of thiselement in braving heavy enemy fire and delivering continuousillumination and HE rounds which helped considerably to hold back theattack. Had the NVA forces gained control of this knoll and set up abase of fire into the Airborne proper, they would have been firingdown the throats of the men defending the fire base.The southwest and other artillerybatteries were not hit by the ground fire, however, they were in themortar pattern which delivered fire throughout the attack.

The 155mmbattery; C/2-11 (4 tubes), had one tube disabled due to a direct hitby 82 mm mortar during the barrage, but continue to fire direct fireand illumination with the remaining three tubes during the contact.The sappers did mange to ignite the powder bags of the 155mm batteryand by 0430 the northern portion of the perimeter was bathed in abrilliant glow. The composite battery of C Battery, 2-319 (2 tubes)and B Battery, 2-319 Artillery received mortar rounds, and one sapperwearing a white cloth around his forehead ran from the north side ofthe perimeter through the 155 howitzers, by the Company CP, into thecomposite battery, flung two satchel charges, and turned around andran the entire distance back. Several men including CPT Johnson sawhim, but were unable to bring him down with small arms.By 0500 a flare ship (Spooky) and othergunships were on station to lend their fire support to the action. Thenearby fire bases were also lending their tubes to the fire andincoming mortars were silenced. LT Pitts, who had decimated andstopped the NVA attack in his area, took seven men to reinforce to SGTBarski's squad. The enemy attack, though, had run out of steam, andthe combined force of Pitts and Barski was able to push to the outerperimeter.

At 0530 the battle was over. The enemy left 39 bodies and2POW's (one died later of wounds), 17 individual weapons and 1crew-served weapon on the battlefield.

The US force suffered 22 KIA,61 WIA, 1 M60 machinegun captured, and 5 artillery pieces damaged.The enemy force was later identified tobe composed of elements from two separate battalions. These battalionswere identified by the two POW's as the 806th Battalion and the K12Sapper Bn. The force directly involved in the attack probablyconsisted of 113 men with additional elements of 2 battalionsproviding support. At least two mortar locations were identified. Theenemy had planned the attack for 4 days and had conducted an excellentreconnaissance of the area. They knew exactly where the points werethat they desired to destroy and how to get there. The attacking forcemoved into their attacking positions at last light on the 12th of May.The attack was scheduled for 0100 hrs, but probably due to slowmovement it did not commence until 0330.The enemy launched his attack on threeprimary axis, it was reported that a diversionary attack had commencedat the same time from the south, but no real evidence in this areacould be located.

The 90mm RR at the south end of the perimeter firedcontinuous suppressive fire with the Fleshet round, which could haveacted as a deterrent.The attack was conceived, planned andexecuted in the typical, thorough fashion of a well trained sapperunit. A stealthy approach, a violent execution lasting approximately90 minutes, and then a hasty withdrawal leaving a covering force incontact. Most of the tip flares in the wire had been neutralized bytying down the striker with a bamboo strip. The enemy dead were wellequipped with satchel charges, dressed in loin cloths or shorts,though several were completely naked. They also wore the head band toprevent sweat from getting in their eyes. They were well built, wellfed husky men with fresh haircuts. The weapons captured were AK47'swith folding stocks, M2 sub machineguns (US) a B41 rocket launcher, a9mm pistol and flare gun.The VC/NVA force was very systematic intheir attempts to completely destroy the one battery.

A satchel chargewould be thrown into a bunker and if any of the wounded men would moanor make noises, a second and third charge would follow until all soundhad ceased. The Fire Directions Center (FDC) of C Battery, 2-319, anexposed Conex container, was hit by an RPG round and the men insidebegan screaming and moaning. One NVA stood on the south side of thecontainer and fired thirty to forty rounds into the Conex. CPTFreeman, the battery CO and battery 1st Sergeant were killed in thisaction.

This NVA soldier was later killed by a member of the 2ndSquad, 1st Platoon, A/2-501.Lessons are being learned and relearnedin the Vietnam theater, and the one lesson, that seems to crop-up timeand time again, is the increased need for security. Security must beactive in the form of patrols and ambushes, and passive in the form ofwire, claymores, listening posts and increased alertness during thehours of darkness. This area was known as an NVA warehouse. In twoseparate caches found within a two kilometer radius, one contained1,000 RPG rounds and another, 12,800 lbs of bagged, polished rice. Allevidence pointed toward the fact that the NVA would attempt to defendthe area. Therefore, the need for security was even greater than in anormal exposed fire base. The enemy suffered heavily in this attack,had he been detected prior to entering the perimeter, his losses maynot have increased but our losses would have been less.

NARRATIVEBY PHILLIP JORDANB Battery, 2/319th Artillery had 2 gunson FSB Airborne. Each gun having 6 men. I was asleep when the attackstarted.

The morter and small arms shook me out of bed. I looked outthe door of my bunker just in time to see one man from gun #5 blownaway. Shortly after, I witnessed another man blown away. My sectionchief exited the bunker and immediately was hit by a satchel charge. Iturned around to get my M16 and I was blown off my feet.

I gave a rollcall and was hit again, being half buried in hot dirt.I then gave the order to leave thebunker and man the howitzer. All were wounded except one man. My bodyhad shielded him from both satchel charges.

I was the only one thatleft the bunker at the time. I made ready for direct fire and loadedbehive rounds, charge 1, time 1.5 seconds fuse. A second lieutenantcame to my gun pit and asked if we had any critical wounded, I toldhim that there were some in gun pit 5.

After we returned to gun pit 4,we were fired at by AK-47's. The A Co, 2/501st infantry bunker infront of my gun was blown. The infantry troops exited and ran towardgun 5.

I immediately fired my howitzer. My men were with me now andwe continued to fire until we were out of beehive rounds. We thenfired high explosive rounds, charge 1, 3.5 second time fuse until theywere expended. We then fired illumination rounds untilthey were expended.Behind us, there was a fire fight goingon back in C battery's gun pit.

We also had two men in FDC and bothmade it out alive but one was hit hard. His name was Sp.4 Miller.

Theother was Lt. He had a radio and called-in fire support,later, air support. We pulled all the wounded into Gun pit 5 exceptfor myself and my section. We fired our M-16s from the gun pit behindus trying to make the LZ safe for medivacs. We watched Snoopy lay downhis rain from the sky and that was awesome. Things got better afterthat and I had to sit down because I was physical exhausted. We thenmade trip after trip bringing the wounded to the LZ.I prayed the whole time we were underattack and I don't think I had been so scared in all my life.

I wasmedivaced out and spent about 30 days in the hospital before returningto my unit. One of the infantry men was shot by someone in pit 5 andhe lost his thumb. He hid in one of the conex containers. I could hearhim screaming infantry-infantry.Editor's Note: On 28 July 1969,Phillip Jordan was awarded the BronzeStar with 'V'Device for heroism in ground combat on 13 May1969.On 13 May 1969 eleven members of Alpha Company were KIA on FSBAirborne. Bruce Saunders died two days later from his wounds.They are listed on the 'In Memory' page of this web.The photo is a composite of 3 photos takenby Dean Seematter (C, 2/319th) in mid August 1969. Shared by GregBucknor.Ashau - date of pix unknown. The left side (not thetop-left) of the hill is the 'knoll'.

This help maintining gameanswer as a complete source of word game guides. What you may find also is a bundle of additional data such as bonus words and images that could be helpful for every single player.I would like to thank our readers who shared their findings like extra words and various hints. I grew up playing scrabble and board games with friends and family. Hidden express level 84. The appearance of word and puzzle games on mobile computing devices made my happiness.To top it all, I’m sharing here all the answers that I found while playing.

You can see the little gully between theknoll and the firebase. The view was taken from the northeast looking southwest.Looking north up the A Shau Valley from the westernperimeter of FSB Airborne. Tiger Mountain is visible in the upper left corner.Photos provided by Greg BucknorMore FSB Airborne photos.